Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.
Introduction
Quantum information theory (QIT) has evolved in recent years into a successful domain of research; so successful that lately Christopher Fuchs, one of the rising stars of this new field, has suggested reformulating the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) in purely information-theoretic terms. Fuchs believes that such reformulation gives us better understanding of the quantum world than any of those that have emerged after so many conferences and debates on the interpretation of QM:
The issue at stake is when will we ever stop burdening the taxpayer with conferences and workshops devoted-explicitly or implicitly-to the quantum foundations? The suspicion is expressed that no end will be in sight until a means is found to reduce quantum theory to two or three statements of crisp physical (rather than abstract, axiomatic) significance. In this regard, no tool appears to be better calibrated for a direct assault than quantum information theory. 1 Fuchs' suggestion is interesting and challenging, and yet it epitomizes a dominant trend among physicists to dismiss decades of discussions on the foundations and interpretation of QM.
2 At stake here is the old and simple question of what our theories are about. Fuchs believes that the way the world is constrains what can be known about it and that these epistemological constraints warrant viewing QM in part as a theory about information; hence nothing better than QIT is appropriate to supply realistic foundations for it. Sympathetic to Fuchs' observation about the relation between ontology and epistemology in QM as I am, I argue that nevertheless QM-indeed scientific theories in general-are about the world around us, and so interpretational questions are part and parcel of the scientific enterprize. This paper is thus aimed to rehabilitate and defend the conceptual foundations of QM in light of the development of QIT. My argument is simple. Fuchs offers us what he calls a new basis for the foundations of QM while denying that in so doing he adopts instrumentalism. And yet this new basis is infected with the very problem interpretations of QM originally set out to resolve, namely, the quantum measurement problem. This situation in itself is harmless if one simply ignores the problem; yet ignoring the problem is tantamount to admitting instrumentalism. Thus Fuchs' dilemma is as follows: either he is a realist, but has not solved the measurement problem (which is fatal for the project) or he is not. In both cases Fuchs' original proposal is simply inconsistent.
The Story about Adam and Eve
Imagine a set up which is a variant of a thought experiment that was originally proposed by Wigner and is commonly known as "Wigner's friend": an experiment is done in a lab, with two separated observers, Eve -confined to the lab; and Adam -outside the lab. Say that Eve is about to measure a spin-1 2 electron in some direction. QM tells Eve what are the probabilities for the two possible results. When Eve performs the experiment her measuring device gets entangled with the electron to yield a superposition that cannot be taken to describe a single result of the measurement, and as a result the pure quantum algorithm stands in flat contradiction to the empirical fact that measurements have (or appear to have) results. Indeed, this is no more than the quantum measurement problem reconstrued.
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Now if one takes an epistemic stance toward the wave function, as Fuchs does, one can evade this problem by suggesting that the wave function simply provides mathematical short hand for information or knowledge available to an observer, in order to compute probabilities for results of experiments. Thus, the tension between the unitary Schrödinger evolution and the single determinate result to be accounted for is relieved as long as one assumes that the quantum states encoded in the wave function are relative to the information available to the observer, that is, that the quantum states depend on the knowledge of the observer and that these states of knowledge are updated simply by applying the orthodox collapse postulate, which in this case has no factual meaning.
On this picture, after the experiment has been performed, Eve updates her knowledge with one of the two possible outcomes by applying the collapse postulate and replacing the superposition with a state corresponding to the result obtained.
We now move outside the lab to consider the point of view of Adam. Here we notice that Adam's knowledge of the quantum state of the entire lab remained the same superposed state that was available to Eve before she updated her knowledge. Now if Adam wishes to compute the state of the lab after Eve's measurement, he can do so with Eve's reduced state, that is, the state confined to the observables of Eve alone, by tracing over all the degrees of freedom other than the relevant ones of Eve. But since no factual collapse ever occurred in the lab, this reduced state cannot be considered to be a classical mixture; it must be an improper mixture.
The epistemic view thus leads to a situation in which the same state is described differently by two observers. From the point of view of Eve the state is pure. From the point of view of Adam the state is an (improper) mixture. 4 Agreed, the two descriptions cannot be distinguished and infinitely many experiments will yield matching subsequent computations. Moreover, it can be shown that no measurement of observables pertaining to the lab alone (i.e., to Eve, her measuring apparatus, or the electron) can decide between them. The reason for this is that the probability distribution for such measurements is completely fixed by the reduced states of the relevant systems.
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And yet, QM itself tells us that there are experiments that can distinguish between the two descriptions.
6,7 Indeed, if no super-selections rules are imposed, then there exists an observable of the lab for which the entangled state of the electron and the measuring apparatus and Eve's mind (or the part of it that records the outcome) is an eigenstate with some definite eigenvalue, and for which the 'collapsed' state after the measurement is not an eigenstate (since the superposition and one of its components are not orthogonal). For these special observables, if Eve and Adam compute the probabilities for subsequent measurements to be carried out at some time on the basis of the information that is available to them now , they will inevitably come up with different predictions: Adam's prediction will be determined by the observable's definite eigenvalue while Eve's prediction will be probabilistic, since for her the state in the lab is not an eigenstate of the observable. One may conclude that the epistemic view is inconsistent, since it yields two different predictions for one and the same experiment, no matter how complicated and difficult the actual performance of the experiment will be.
What Price Consistency
If one is a sophisticated proponent of the epistemic view, then one has at least two ways to oppose the inconsistency claim. The point I wish to make, however, is that in so doing one automatically characterizes oneself as an instrumentalist, and this flatly contradicts Fuchs' original claim to supply QM with realistic foundations.
The first objection one can raise in order to defend the consistency of the epistemic view in light of our thought experiment is exactly that the latter is a thought experiment, and that for all practical purposes such re-interference experiments are impossible. The basic idea behind this FAPP objection is that it is practically impossible to isolate physical systems and hence due to environmental decoherence no such re-interference experiments can actually be preformed: the superposition in the lab, which is the source of the alleged inconsistency, will rapidly decohere.
And yet, decoherence by itself cannot and does not solve the measurement problem in the way that collapse interpretations, no collapse interpretations, or hidden variables theories, do. What it can do is to supply a consistency proof for the appearance of a classical world with an underlying quantum dynamics. It can explain why we never see macroscopic superpositions, not why they do not exist. Relying on decoherence alone, the epistemic view renders QM a theory that can never be caught in a lie rather than a theory that tells the truth. No realist can deny there is a difference here. The second objection that a proponent of the epistemic view can raise hinges on the time-reversal-invariant character of orthodox QM.
b Let us call it the ERA-SURE objection. One might claim that even if re-interference experiments could be performed, they would 'erase' Eve's memory, since Adam -having as he does complete control of all the degrees of freedom in the lab -can undo Eve's observation. In other words, since according to the epistemic view the collapse is non factual, Schrödinger's equation allows such reversal; and since Eve's memory and the interference observable do not commute, Eve will have no record whatsoever of her 'collapsed' state and consistency would be restored.
A possible response to the ERASURE objection is to press on. The epistemic view, one may say, cannot escape contradiction since there must be a fact of the matter whether a result of an experiment is deterministic or probabilistic, irrespective of one's knowledge of it. Note, however, that this response presupposes a certain realistic stance towards quantum probabilities. In saying that "there must be a fact of the matter whether a result of an experiment is deterministic or probabilistic" one clearly regards quantum probabilities as objective propensities, which is exactly what Fuchs takes great pains to deny. According to the epistemic view, quantum probabilities are not objective propensities. Rather, they are degrees of subjective belief, or gambling commitments, and as such can co-vary with different observers, as long as the state-assignments of the two observers are compatible, i.e., as long as the state-assignments do not differ in an arbitrary way. Thus, a better response to the ERASURE objection which does not attribute to the epistemic view an assumption it denies would be to show that Adam's and Eve's state-assignments are incompatible. It turns out that according to one compatibility condition this is indeed the case;
9 but according to another it isn't. seems that the discussion threatens to be degraded to mere book-keeping, so let me quickly point out again that the issue at stake is not whether the epistemic view is consistent, but what price its consistency.
c
As in the case of the FAPP objection, the epistemic view reclaims consistency only at the price of instrumentalism, since relativizing quantum probabilities to the observer (which is analogous to what Einstein did to simultaneity in the special theory of relativity) is tantamount to stipulating an arbitrary cut between the observer and Nature. And although it is true that one can shift this cut according to whim, it is also true that according to the epistemic view what counts as real is now dependent on where this cut is made.
Taking stock, one can still argue that our thought experiment might not give sophisticated proponents of the epistemic view such as Fuchs much pause for thought. However, it does expose the fact that this view is indifferent to the measurement problem. Since ignoring this problem is tantamount to admitting instrumentalism, while the indifference of the epistemic view to the measurement problem is in itself harmless it is quite at odds with Fuchs' original goal to supply QM with realistic foundations.
One can grant Fuchs that QM indicates that the ontology of the world puts constraints on our epistemology (call this conjunct (1)) and as a result one must reject no-collapse theories such as Bohmian mechanics or modal interpretations which aim to complete the quantum description. One can also grant Fuchs the epistemic view of the wave function (call this conjunct (2)). But as the objections to our thought experiment demonstrate, one must also accept that the conjunction of these two ideas is tantamount to saying that epistemology dictates ontology. The latter, of course, is not a position a realist can adopt; hence Fuchs' apologetics and denial of the accusations regarding his 'Kantianism', 'idealism', and 'instrumentalism' turn out to be nothing but window-dressing.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show that no matter how interesting they are, the suggestions to reformulate the axioms of QM in information-theoretic terms cannot be regarded as supplying a realistic foundation to QM. Fuchs' 'thin' realism, and the entire 'fog from the north' which inspires it, d are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise. Of course there would be no science without scientists but this does not mean that the ultimate subject matter of science is the scientist and his relation to the world, no matter how sensitive the latter is to his touch.
c Note that nothing in the formalism of QM prevents us from viewing Adam and Eve as the same system (with different degrees of freedom), and so notwithstanding the compatibility of the state assignments, there is still no subjective consistent account of QM probabilities which will explain all the statistics of actual experiments. The standard measurement problem infects all quantum theories, be they quantum field theories, 11 quantum cosmology, 12 or, as we have seen, quantum information theory, 13 and yet no one can plausibly argue that in order to make progress in these fields the measurement problem must be solved. Matters are quite different, however, when one ignores the measurement problem and claims further to have made progress in foundational issues. I am afraid the taxpayer will have to find someone else to rely on in relieving himself from the burden of financing conferences on quantum foundations.
